Held, appeal allowed. There was a fundamental difference between the general duty under section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 and the specific duty under section 22(3). Under section 17(1)(a) every local authority was under a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need within their area by providing a range of services appropriate to their needs. Under section 22(3), a local authority looking after a child was under a specific duty to safeguard and promote his welfare. A duty of care could not arise simply as a result of the local authority’s general duties such as those under section 17(1)(a), but it might arise as a result of the local authority’s exercise of its specific duties to a child if, on the specific facts of the case, the circumstances amounted to an assumption of responsibility for the child. The operation of a statutory scheme did not automatically generate an assumption of responsibility, but such an assumption might arise out of the local authority’s conduct pursuant to a statutory scheme. Depending on the facts of the case, an assumption of responsibility might arise out of the local authority’s conduct where it acquired parental responsibility for a child when granted a care order under section 31, or an interim care order under section 38. The circumstances in which a local authority might assume responsibility for a child so as to give rise to a duty of care under the law of negligence were not confined to cases where it acquired parental responsibility under the 1989 Act, and the question as to in what other circumstances did a local authority assume responsibility for a specific child so as to give rise to a duty of care could be only answered definitively on a case by case basis by reference to the specific facts of each case. A duty of care might arise (i) in respect of looked-after children if circumstances arose which amounted to an assumption of responsibility by the local authority, and (ii) where a local authority, acting in accordance with its duties under statute, regulation, or statutory guidance, had taken, or resolved to take, a specific step to safeguard or promote the welfare of a child which amounted to an assumption of responsibility for a child. In each of those broad categories, the question whether a duty of care had arisen would depend on the specific facts of the case, which would include the specific requirements under statute, regulations or guidance in force at the time. It was important to emphasise that, in exercising their statutory powers and duties, local authority social workers had a wide discretion and were often required to make complex and difficult assessments of what should be done to safeguard and promote the welfare of the particular child. A claimant asserting that there had been a breach of a duty of care in such cases so as to give rise to a claim in negligence was therefore likely to face a high hurdle. Where, as in the present cases, a local authority had been involved with the child over a number of years, exercising its statutory duties and powers by providing services to the child in order to safeguard and promote his welfare, identifying whether there had been an assumption of responsibility by the local authority might be a complex exercise. For those reasons, as the area of law was still developing, it would be wrong to reach a definitive conclusion and strike out a claim before the evidence had been heard, the facts had been found and a thorough analysis of the exercise of those powers and duties had been undertaken at trial. In the case of YXA the court concluded that a local authority accommodating a child under section 20 of the 1989 Act was capable of amounting to “something more” so as to give rise to an assumption of responsibility by the local authority. Accordingly, that was not a claim which should have been struck out. In the case of HXA, the child was never accommodated under section 20, but the local authority was involved with the family for a number of years, exercising its statutory powers and duties and an agreement to carry out keeping safe work could be said to amount to “something more” so as to amount to an assumption of responsibility, which was what the claimant was averring. In those circumstances, it had been wrong to strike out that claim (paras 90–107,109,110).