The claimant obtained a registration order under the Administration of Justice Act 1920 recording various costs orders made by a court in the Bahamas as orders of the Queen’s Bench Division. The master granted the defendant a stay of the registration order. The judge dismissed the claimant’s appeal, holding that (i) the master had discretion to stay the registration order under CPR r 3.1(2)(f); (ii) his discretion was not governed by CPR r 83.7, which required special circumstances to be shown as to why enforcement would be inexpedient, since that only applied where a judgment debtor or other party was liable to execution of a writ of control or warrant, which the claimant had not issued in the present case; and (iii) if that was wrong, that there were special circumstances in any event to exercise the discretion under CPR r 83.7 to order a stay of the registration order.
On the claimant’s appeal—
Held, appeal allowed. A writ of control or warrant did not need to be issued for CPR r 83.7 to apply. The rule clearly applied on the making of the judgment or order for payment of money. The words “the debtor or other party liable to execution of a writ of control or a warrant” in the rule described the persons capable of applying for a stay under the rule as opposed to the commencement of the time from which a potential application arose. It would be inconvenient if the power to suspend execution had to wait until the enforcement process was issued. A debtor was entitled to apply for a stay of execution generally under CPR r 83.7 whether through a writ of control or other means. There was no reason in appropriate circumstances why a court should not impose a general stay of execution under the rule, which would in practice prevent the pursuit of bankruptcy proceedings similar to a general stay pending an appeal. Therefore, CPR r 83.7 prohibited the operation of CPR r 3.1(2)(f) concerning money judgments. In the present case, the judge had incorrectly held that the discretion of the court should be exercised under CPR r 3.1(2)(f) rather than CPR r 83.7. Her alternative conclusion that the registration order should be stayed under CPR r 83.7 was unsound. Accordingly, the court re-exercised the discretion and ordered the lifting of the stay of execution ordered by the master (paras 13, 15, 18, 40, 43, 44).
Per McCombe LJ. The wording “other party liable to execution” in CPR r 83.7(1) provides an opportunity to other persons potentially affected prejudicially by execution of a writ of control or warrant to apply for a stay of execution (para 14).
Decision of Whipple J [2015] EWHC 2847 (QB) reversed.
Charles Samek QC and Adam Solomon (instructed directly) for the firm.
The defendant in person.