Twin children, a boy and a girl, were born to the mother, who had mental health difficulties. Shortly after their birth, the court made an interim care order in respect of the children and they were placed with foster carers. As a result of the making of the care order, section 33(3) of the Children Act 1989 conferred upon the local authority designated in the order parental responsibility for the children and the power to determine the extent to which the parents might meet their parental responsibility for them. The local authority had concerns that the mother wished to register the children’s forenames as “Preacher” and “Cyanide” respectively. Accordingly it applied, pursuant to section 100(3) of the 1989 Act, for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction so as to prevent the mother naming the children with the proposed names and registering those names. The judge held that section 100(4)(5) of the 1989 Act prohibited the inherent jurisdiction from being used in the way the local authority sought, since the result which the authority wished to achieve could be achieved via section 33(3) of the 1989 Act, in that the local authority had the power under section 33(3)(b) to prevent the mother from giving the children the proposed names since the naming of a child (which a parent had a duty to do pursuant to section 2(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953) was an aspect of parental responsibility. He granted a declaration that the local authority was permitted to prevent the mother from giving her twins the proposed forenames and an injunction restraining the mother from registering the children’s proposed forenames or referring to them by the forenames during contact. Following the judge’s decision the twins moved permanently to live with the foster family with whom their two eldest half-siblings lived. Those half-siblings chose names which they wanted the twins to be given. The mother appealed against the judge’s order.
On the appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. (1) Having regard to the definition of “parental responsibility” in section 3(1) of the Children Act 1989 as “rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to a child”, both (i) the choosing of a name (forename and surname) for a child by a parent with parental responsibility and (ii) thereafter the act of complying with the parents’ duty under section 2(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 to give to the registrar information of the particulars required to be registered concerning the birth, and in the presence of the registrar to sign the register, were acts of parental responsibility (paras 53–54, 118, 119).
(2) A local authority with parental responsibility for a child was not prohibited from interfering in the mother’s choice of forename for the child by section 33(9) of the Children Act 1989. The existence of the parental duty to register a birth under section 2(1) of the 1953 Act did not mean that the naming of a child and the registration of the child’s birth by a parent were rights or duties which that parent had “by virtue of any other enactment”, within section 33(9) of the 1989 Act. Accordingly, subject to the parents’ right to respect for their private and family life, guaranteed by article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the local authority had power to exercise its parental responsibility under section 33(3) of the 1989 Act in order to prevent the mother from giving her twins the forenames of her choice. The judge had erred in declaring that the local authority was “permitted” to restrict the extent to which the mother exercised her parental responsibility. On a strict reading of section 33(3) of the 1989 Act it had the power to do exactly as it proposed (paras 64–66, 118, 119).
(3) In the highly unusual circumstance that a local authority believed that the forename chosen by the parent of a child in care, and by which he or she intended to register the child, went beyond the unusual, bizarre, extreme or plain foolish, and instead gave the authority reasonable cause to believe that by calling him or her than name he or she was likely to be cause significant harm, the proper route by which the authority shoud seek to ensure that the course it proposed was necessary and in the child’s best interests was by putting the matter before the High Court by way of an application under section 100(3) of the Children Act 1989 to invoke its inherent jurisdiction. The use of the inherent jurisdiction would not be precluded by section 100(4)(5) of the 1989 Act in such circumstances. First, section 100(4)(a) would be satisfied: the result which the local authority wished to achieve could not be achieved by other means since (i) there was no provision or requirement in section 33 of the 1989 Act for an authority to make an application in relation to the giving or changing of a child’s forename and (ii), by virtue of section 9(1) of the 1989 Act, neither a prohibited steps order nor a specific issue order would be available to the authority. Secondly, section 100(4)(b) would also be satisfied, since there would be likelihood of significant harm (paras 76–77, 98, 100–105, 118, 119).
(4) Giving the girl twin the forename “Cyanide” was capable, without more, of giving the court reasonable cause to believe that she would be likely to suffer significant emotional harm, in relation to her sense of identity and self-worth and to her day-to-day life as a child. Although “Preacher” in itself might not be an objectionable name, there was considerable benefit for the boy twin to be in the same position as his sister and for each of them to grow up knowing that their half-siblings had chosen both of their names for them. Accordingly, the order sought by the local authority would be granted (paras 107–109, 113–117, 118, 119).
Ruth Henke QC and Rhys Evans (instructed by Head of Legal and Democratic Services, Powys County Council, Llandrindod Wells) for the local authority.
Kathryn Skellorn QC and David Johns (instructed by Humfrys & Symonds Solicitors, Hereford) for the mother.
James Tillyard QC and Rhian Jones (instructed by Humphreys & Co Solicitors, Bristol) for the children.