There was no limitation by which the offence of assisting unlawful immigration, contrary to section 25(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, was inapplicable in relation to asylum seekers. Further, section 25(3) of that Act was permissive only, so that a matter of foreign law might be proved by methods such as expert evidence or admission as well as by a government-issued certificate as set out in section 25(3).

The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held when dismissing an application by the defendant, Arya Bina, for permission to appeal against his conviction on 14 December 2012 in the Crown Court at Kingston-upon-Thames before Judge Coello and a jury on a count of conspiracy to facilitate a breach of immigration law contrary to section 25(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, a count of conspiracy to facilitate the arrival of an asylum seeker contrary to section 25A(1) of the 1971 Act, two counts of facilitating the arrival of an asylum seeker contrary to section 25A(1) and four counts of converting criminal property contrary to section 327(1)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

MCCOMBE LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said that three points had been taken to support a submission that there had been no case to answer. The first point was that section 25(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 was inapplicable in relation to asylum seekers, but there was nothing in section 25(1) to that effect; the provision dealt with illegal immigration without limitation; R v Kapoor [2012] 1 WLR 3569 was to be distinguished. The second point, which was that count 1 should have referred to section 25A(1) rather than section 25(1), also fell. The third point was that the conspiracy counts should have referred to section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1977 rather than section 1, but that was not correct on the facts; the defendant had been present, and his actions had been taken, in the UK; it was not a foreign conspiracy; R v Patel (Sophia) [2009] 2 Cr App R(S) 475 was to be distinguished. A further ground was that the relevant Spanish law had not been proved by certification in accordance with section 25(3) of the 1971 Act, but section 25(3) was permissive and foreign law could be proved by other methods such as expert evidence or, as had happened in the present case, by admission. A further ground was that the trial judge should have directed the jury to disregard evidence relating to a count which had been ruled out on the basis that there was no case to answer, but that ground could not be accepted because the evidence had been relevant to other counts. The application for leave was therefore refused.