Two members of the public summoned the police because they said they had seen an altercation between the defendant and another man and that the defendant had been holding a knife and acting threateningly. There was no dispute that when stopped by the police officers the defendant was in possession of two kitchen knives. The defendant immediately told the officers that he had been attacked by a man and had disarmed him. The defendant was charged with two offences of having with him in a public place an article with a blade or point, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The defendant’s evidence at trial was that shortly before the police arrived he had been attacked by the other man who had been armed with knives; that he managed to disarm him and so take possession of the knives which he intended to get rid of. It was submitted on his behalf that if the defendant had only acquired the knives minutes before then he could not have “had them with him” within the meaning of section 139, which expression also appeared in section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Earlier authority on the construction of that section had held that no offence was committed where an assailant seized a weapon for instant use on his victim; the prosecution had to show that the defendant was carrying the weapon and had the intent to use it offensively before any occasion for its actual use had arisen. The judge rejected that submission and the defendant was convicted. He appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge’s ruling was wrong because similar considerations had to apply to the 1988 Act as applied to the 1953 Act in that the statutes were aimed at the same mischief and that, in framing the later legislation, Parliament had to have mirrored the language of the earlier Act, using the phrase “has with him” as meaning that he had it with him before a point of instant use.
On the appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. The distinction between the two statutes was clear. It did not lie in the test of possession, but in the description or test of the relevant article and in the formulation of the two different statutes. The actus reus of the 1953 offence, where the article concerned was not offensive by its very nature, required proof of the accused’s intention at the time. To that extent the actus reus and the mens rea overlapped. In the 1988 legislation there was no requirement of proof that the bladed article was carried offensively, or indeed for any other particular reason. The context of the two statutes also differed. The mischief aimed at by the later statute was the possession in public of a bladed article. The definition of “bladed article” was objective. The complication of rendering an innocent article offensive by intent did not arise. The application of the statute was straightforward. If a person had with him for a short time—for a very short time—a bladed article, that proved the actus reus of the offence under the 1988 Act; and the burden of showing that he had good reason or lawful authority fell upon him. In any event, on the facts of the present case, the problem posited by the defendant’s submission did not arise. The prosecution case was clear: that some little time after the moment when, on his own account, the defendant divested the other man of the knives, he was still in possession of them. That was not an instantaneous possession, rendering possession of a weapon offensive only by the formation of an instant purpose, converting the knives from innocent objects to offensive weapons. The facts here did not give rise to, and could not found, the defendant’s argument (paras 12, 18–20, 22–24).
Matthew Hodgetts (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the defendant.
Mike Hollis (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Appeals Unit) for the Crown.