The local housing authority refused the applicant’s application for homelessness assistance under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 on the basis that he was not in priority need for housing. That decision was upheld on review. The applicant applied out of time for permission to appeal against the review decision under section 204 of the Act for the reason that his lack of legal representation amounted to “good reason” within the meaning of section 204(2A)(b). The judge in the County Court granted the application having found it reasonable for the applicant to wait for the housing charity from whom he had sought assistance to secure legal representation for him. In allowing the housing authority’s appeal, the High Court judge held that the judge below had misdirected himself as to what was required to demonstrate “good reason” and that attempts to secure legal aid were of no material consequence relying, in particular, on authorities in which the principles to be applied for applications for relief from sanction under CPR r 3.9 had been held to apply by analogy to applications for extensions of time under other provisions of the CPR.
On the applicant’s appeal—
Held, appeal allowed. Section 204(2)(A) of the 1996 lay laid down a statutory test, “good reason”, the content and effect of which had not been changed by the strict approach adopted in recent years by the courts towards failure to comply with provisions of the CPR or with the corresponding rules of the Upper Tribunal. Although appeals under section 204 were brought in accordance with the procedural rules in the CPR, those rules did not define “good reason” and neither changes to the rules themselves nor the court’s approach towards failure to comply with them could alter the statutory test for “good reason” within section 204(2A) when considering an application to appeal against a review decision out of time. Good reason was the only relevant factor to which that provision was concerned. The consistent approach of the courts towards that statutory test of taking all the circumstances into account without applying any particular presumptions should not be qualified by importing into it principles derived in relation to compliance with the CPR. A restriction in the circumstances that could be taken into account would create the possibility of to unjust outcomes that could not have been intended by Parliament. It would be both surprising and unfair if difficulties in obtaining legal representation and legally aided funding could not be taken fully into account and given appropriate weight in the assessment of whether there was good reason for not bringing an appeal in time and any delay in applying for permission to do so out of time. The basic rule remained the 21-day time limit under section 204(2). The circumstances had to be examined with care where an applicant relied on being unrepresented and seeking legal aid as a reason for being out of time. If satisfied on the question of good reason, the court then had a discretion to grant permission for an appeal to be brought out of time and was able at that stage to take into account all other relevant considerations in deciding how to exercise its discretion. Therefore, the principles established and applied in analogous contexts under the CPR and the Upper Tribunal rules concerning applications for an extension of time did not apply to the assessment of whether there was “good reason” for the purposes of section 204(2A). In the present case, the judge in the County Court had directed himself correctly and it had been reasonably open to him to conclude that there was good reason within section 204(2A) for the delay. There was no proper basis to interfere with that assessment. Accordingly, the order of the County Court judge granting the application was reinstated (paras 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46).
Richard O’Sullivan (instructed by Tyrer Roxburgh, Wood Green) for the applicant.
Mark Baumohl (instructed by Solicitor, Tower Hamlets London Borough Council) for the housing authority.
Liz Davies and Connor Johnston (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer llp) (all acting pro bono) for the intervener.