Held, appeal dismissed. (1) When determining whether the description given of the extradition offence was sufficient to satisfy the dual criminality requirement in section 137(3)(b) of the 2003 Act, it was necessary to strike a balance between a requested person’s need to have an adequate description of the conduct alleged against him, and the legislative policy of the 2003 Act to make the extradition process, whether under Parts 1 or 2, simpler and more efficient. The conduct alleged in the warrant had to be capable of amounting to an offence under English law, but need not amount to proof of guilt. It was sufficient that the allegations, whether in relation to actus reus or mens rea, would, if proved, constitute an English offence. Where, as in the present case, a request alleged multiple offences, each should be considered separately but need not be assigned a reciprocal offence under English law. Where the alleged conduct relevant to a number of offences was closely interconnected, it did not matter whether that conduct would be charged under English law in the same manner as in the requesting state. There was no legal requirement for the requesting state to demonstrate a prima facie case in respect of any of the offences detailed in the indictment. The court’s determination of the adequacy of the particulars given in the extradition request did not involve any inquiry into evidential sufficiency or quality, it was concerned with whether the warrant, or request for extradition, disclosed matters capable of constituting conduct amounting to the alleged offences (paras 21, 25, 26, 87, 88).

(2) There was no support for the general proposition that when considering dual criminality, mens rea required under English law might never be inferred from the conduct alleged unless that inference was impelled, or the only reasonable inference, or inevitable. It sufficed that the necessary mental element could be inferred by the court from the conduct identified in the documents or that the conduct alleged included matters capable of sustaining” the mental element necessary under English law (paras 27, 28, 52, 54).

(3) The conduct alleged against the requested person under each count depended on her criminal liability being established as an accessory. Accessory liability required proof of a conduct element accompanied by the necessary mental element. The particulars in the extradition request were sufficient to satisfy the dual criminality requirement in section 137(3)(b) of the 2003 Act for the conduct element as well as the mental element of murder as an accessory. Any criticism of the extradition request went to the level of evidential support for the allegations, rather than to the issue of whether the request identified an offence known to English law (paras 30, 31, 44, 90, 92).

Per curiam. The “inevitable inference” test (that it is only permissible to infer from alleged conduct the mens rea required for the equivalent English offence if, in the circumstances of the case, that inference would be inevitable or the only reasonable inference that could be drawn) is solely aimed at preventing a person being extradited and then convicted in the requesting state on a basis which would not constitute an offence under English law. Where an essential ingredient under our criminal law is missing from the offence for which extradition is sought, a requirement for dual criminality is nonetheless satisfied if the court concludes that that ingredient would be the inevitable corollary of proving the matters alleged to constitute the foreign offence. But, there is no legal justification for applying that “inevitable inference” test more widely. To do so would involve breaching the general principle that a court dealing with a request for extradition is not concerned to assess the strength of the evidence that would be presented in any trial in the foreign court. Accordingly, in other circumstances, the relevant test is whether an inference is capable of being drawn. Some “missing ingredient” problems cannot be overcome by the drawing of an inference to fill the gap, for example, where it would be legally impossible to draw the inference needed (paras 61, 62, 83, 84).