Only the owner of dog or a person otherwise able to demonstrate a relationship to the dog such that its destruction would be an interference with their rights under article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which could include a person for the time being in charge of the dog within the meaning of section 4B(2A) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, has standing to intervene in an application for the destruction of the dog under section 4B(1) of the 1991 Act to contend that it is not a prohibited breed to which section 1 of the Act applies. Furthermore, only the owner or person for the time being in charge of the dog has standing to make representations that the dog, if found to be one to which section 1 applies, does not constitute a danger to public safety within the meaning of section 4B(2A) (paras 30, 39, 40, 41).

Where, therefore, on an application by the police commissioner for a destruction order under section 4B(1)(a) of the 1991 Act in respect of a dog alleged to be a pit bull type dog falling within the definition in section 1 of the Act, the district judge had made a preliminary ruling that an individual who had neither owned, possessed nor been in charge of the dog had no standing to intervene in the application, and where on an appeal by way of case stated issues arose as to whether the district judge’s ruling was correct and whether the appellant, a second individual who had neither owned nor possessed the dog, but had made financial contributions to its upkeep in local authority kennels during the proceedings could fall within the definition of a person for the time being in charge of the dog—