Held, appeal allowed. In the ordinary course of events uncertainties both as to the fact of inheritance and as to the times at which it would occur, would make it impossible to hold that an inheritance prospect was property which was “likely to be had in the foreseeable future” within section 25(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The present case was different. The wife’s inheritance prospects did not have the inherent uncertainty found where a will was made in a country such as England where there was no concept of forced heirship. A prospective inheritance which had the certainty brought to it by the laws of forced heirship, was capable of being a “financial resource” which the wife “has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future”. All that such a finding did was to conclude that the prospective inheritance was a section 25(2)(a) resource; it did not mean that it was inevitably appropriate for the court to make an order whereby the meeting of the needs of the wife in any way depended on the prospective inheritance. Prior to making any order the judge had to consider all the section 25 factors in addition, before making an order tying the parties together for many years to come by way of a Mesher order (especially where the money was available to allow for a clean break between the parties). Careful and specific consideration should be given both to the issues of potential conflict between the parties and also to the wife’s past and future contribution to the welfare of the family (per section 25(2)(f)). That was particularly important on the facts of the present case in the context of there being a special needs child who was likely to need care from his mother long after he had achieved his statutory majority. The judge had been wrong to have made an order which was dependent upon that future inheritance in order to meet the needs of the wife (paras 33, 39–40, 42–43, 47–50, 63, 70, 74, 99, 103, 106, 107).