Held, appeal allowed in part. (1) The construction of section 82(1)(b) of the New Roads and Streetworks Act 1991 adopted by the judge which excluded FSG payments from the scope of “expenses reasonably incurred in making good damage” was correct. That section clearly excluded financial losses suffered consequent upon physical damage. That was the ordinary meaning of the words used, made more abundantly clear by the use of the words “expenses” and the inclusion of the concept of “reasonableness”. As made clear by the statutory provisions, FSG payments were sums which a gas transporter was required to pay customers as compensation for its failure to meet standards of performance by failing to provide a supply of gas to them. Where there was damage to a gas pipe that required repair, FSG payments were a consequence of that damage, not the repair. The requirement to make such payments was triggered, not by the repairs as such, but by the interruption of the gas supply, and it continued until the supply was restored, irrespective of whether and when any remedial work was carried out to enable the supply to be resumed. The statutory compensation payments attracted by the interruption of the gas supply could not be converted into expenses incurred “in making good damage” which led to such interruption. The nature of FSG payments was compensation for loss of supply (paras 19–24, 28, 87, 88).

(2) On its true construction, section 82 of the 1991 Act—looked at discretely, or as part of a broader scheme comprising various provisions—provided a strict liability scheme for the expenses incurred in making good damage to apparatus in the street which was in addition to, and not in displacement of, the rights of the victim of that damage at common law. On its face, section 82(6) expressly retained any liability an undertaker might have over and above its liability under the strict liability provisions of section 82. Even if section 82(6) was not unambiguous, it was not arguable that it clearly and unambiguously had the construction which the judge favoured. Moreover, there was no “incompatibility” or “positive inconsistency” between the common law remedy and the statutory remedy. On the true construction of section 82(1)(b), in respect of damage to street apparatus by an undertaker, Parliament intended the statutory regime (of strict liability with recovery limited to expenses of making good, with a complete statutory defence in respect of damage attributable to the misconduct or negligence of the person suffering the damage or a third party) to run with, and not displace, common law rights (with its requirement to prove negligence, but with full financial recovery, subject to a defence of contributory negligence). Although both remedies arose out of the same events and circumstances, they did not cover precisely the same ground, because the statutory remedy did not require proof of negligence. There was therefore no logical inconsistency between the two: it was perfectly open to Parliament to consider that, when street apparatus was damaged by a section 82 event, the person having that apparatus in the street should be paid the costs of repair on a strict liability basis, but, if he wished to recover anything more, then he had to prove negligence. That was Parliament’s intention and section 82(6) was sufficient to indicate that. Nothing within the scheme suggested that Parliament did not intend there to be two different schemes in play, with the limited statutory remedy being available even without proof of negligence. Looking at the whole of section 82 in its proper context, there was nothing that to persuade the court that Parliament intended to oust the common law rights of such a person. Consequently the order dismissing the claim would be quashed, and an order made allowing the claim and entering judgment for the claimant (post, paras 36–38, 42, 43, 44–45, 51, 52–55, 56, 57–59, 66, 84–86, 87, 88).