The court’s approach to the interpretation of statements made by public bodies that were said to give rise to a legitimate expectation required it, inter alia, to ascertain the meaning which the authority’s statements would reasonably convey to the claimant in the light of all the background knowledge which he/she had in the situation in which she was at the time that the statements were made.

Stuart-Smith J, sitting in the Administrative Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, so held in dismissing a claim for judicial review by the claimant, Ms Alansi, challenging the decision of the defendant local authority, Newham London Borough Council, dated 23 October 2012 and reaffirmed on 24 December 2012, that under its new housing allocation scheme the claimant was no longer entitled to be treated as being in the priority homeseeker category but instead the homeseeker category, even though the authority had made representations that she would retain priority homeseeker status. It was common ground that being in the homeseeker category rather than the priority homeseeker category meant that she would have no realistic prospect of being allocated a property under the authority’s scheme.

STUART-SMITH J said that it was common ground that a ruling or statement relied on to found a legitimate expectation had to be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”. The approach to the interpretation of statements made by public bodies that were said to give rise to a legitimate expectation was analogous to the approach to be adopted when considering the meaning and quality of advice given by professionals to their clients. The court should ascertain the meaning which the authority’s statements would reasonably convey to the claimant in the light of all the background knowledge which she had in the situation in which she was at the time that the statements were made. Further the court would be required to consider whether the public authority had struck the correct balance between the public interest and the interests of the claimant. In doing so, it would ask whether the public authority had shown there to be an overriding public interest that justified departing from the assurance that had been given. The test to be applied was whether frustrating the claimant’s expectation was so unfair that to take a new and different course would amount to an abuse of power. Once the expectation had been established, the court had to weigh the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied on for the change of policy. Both procedural and substantive unfairness might be taken into account when applying that test. Reliance and detriment were not essential prerequisites to a finding of unlawful abuse of power but their presence (or absence) might be taken into account in deciding where the balance of fairness lay and whether the authority had acted unlawfully. The court should give due weight to the proper role of public authorities as agents of change and as being responsible for the adoption and implementation of policies that were in the public interest even though they might conflict with the interest of private individuals, including those to whom assurances had been given. Being afforded priority under a housing allocation scheme was no guarantee of being awarded permanent accommodation either at all or within any particular time scale. On the facts, the representations and assurances made by the authority to the claimant were clear and unambiguous to the effect that she would retain priority homeseeker status. However, by balancing all of the principled considerations, the authority succeeded in displacing the prima facie finding that its conduct was unreasonable. It would be wrong to characterise the authority’s conduct as being an unlawful abuse of power. It was better characterised as a proportionate response to a pressing and widespread social problem which struck a proper balance between the competing claims of many different interests.