The single meaning rule in the law of defamation, namely what the adjudicator at trial considered was the one and only meaning a reasonable reader of the alleged defamatory words should have understood was the natural and ordinary meaning of those words, was applicable where the defence of honest comment was raised.

Where a comment, honestly expressed in a media publication and grounded on a sufficient factual basis, might reasonably be thought to carry an additional imputation which might not be so grounded, the defendant should not ordinarily be held liable for that imputation unless it was maliciously advanced. Cases might arise where the imputation, though unintended, was so to speak so large that the balance of the public interest in freedom of expression and private right to reputation required the claim to be carried forward.

The Court of Appeal so held when dismissing the appeal of the claimant, Jacqui Lait (in her claim against the defendant, Evening Standard Ltd, that the natural and ordinary meaning of words in an article in the first edition of the Evening Standard of 9 November 2009 were defamatory of her) from the decision of Eady J on 9 December 2010 [2010] EWHC 3239 (QB) dismissing the claimant’s application for summary judgment that the defence, raising pleas of justification and fair comment, was bound to fail, and granting the defendant’s application for summary judgment that its defence of fair comment was bound to succeed.

The claimant, the former Conservative MP for Beckenham, and three female MPs signed a letter published in The Times on 9 November 2009, the same date as the article, expressing concerns about proposed reforms to MPs expenses following the notorious controversies in 2009 over expenses relating to MPs, who had their constituency homes outside London, being permitted to recover various costs including mortgage interest reimbursements when obtaining additional accommodation nearer to London. Their concerns were based on perceived discouragement to women standing as MPs and their exposure to unnecessary risk. The article commenting on the letter said their “criticism may risk the ire of some”, adding that the claimant had claimed large sums to travel to her home in Sussex even though her constituency home was 11 miles from Westminster and that she had been “forced” to pay back nearly £25,000 of capital gains made on the sale of a home funded by the taxpayer. The claimant in fact had not been forced to repay £25,000 or any sum. The defendants wrongly ascribed the allegation which concerned a different MP. A laconic correction was published on 26 November, with no further reparation offered.

Following amendment to the particulars of claim, the allegation was that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words was that (i) the claimant milked the parliamentary expenses system by buying a second home with taxpayers’ money and selling it with a large capital gain, (ii) her publicly stated opposition to the proposed reform could legitimately be regarded as insincere and hypocritical, and (iii) her conduct was thereby disreputable, underhand and dishonourable so that her criticism of the reform was apt to provoke anger. In the re-amended defence meanings (i) and (ii) were said to constitute honest comment. In the claimant’s reply it was said that no capital gain was realised on the sale of the constituency property. The defendants discovered at a later date that the sale of the property realised a profit of £174,000 of which about £135,000 represented a gain generated by the mortgage loan on which the taxpayer had paid the interest.

LAWS LJ said that the classic exposition of the single meaning rule was in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 171–174, per Diplock LJ: there was no express discussion of its application to the honest comment defence although the defence was in issue; Diplock LJ’s remarks had to be taken as applying in that context. Those observations were expressly approved in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65, 71–72; cf also Burstein v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 4 All ER 319, paras 7–8. At least since Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275, where observations of the court, at pp 279, 281 and 282, only made sense on the footing that the court was applying the rule in its assessment of the honest comment defence, the law had proceeded on the premise, albeit more often assumed than argued, that the rule applied to the adjudication of such a defence. The judge in essence found meaning (i) was established and that meaning (ii) was at most an additional imputation, and his Lordship agreed with that. The single meaning rule was not taken out of the case by the status of the hypocrisy meaning as an additional imputation only. The real question in the case was whether the judge should have left the two alternatives, meaning (i) on its own, and meaning (i) plus meaning (ii), so that a jury might decide which of them was right. The balance to be struck between the public interest in freedom of expression and the private right to reputation would be a material consideration where the court had to consider the principles laid down in Yousef Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946, paras 55–59, 69, in a case where a responsible media defendant pleaded honest comment; that was fortified by section 12(4)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. In the present case there was no overt reference to hypocrisy in the words complained of. At most the charge of hypocrisy might be a reason in the minds of some for being angered by the claimant’s subscription to the letter to The Times. The judge rightly concluded that the claim to be compensated for the possible imputation of hypocrisy should not be permitted to consume further time and large sums of money. As regards whether meaning (iii) would be properly maintainable at trial, the judge rightly held that the real sting in the mistaken reference to repayment of £25,000 was not so much that the claimant was forced to pay the money over; rather that the profit was made with taxpayers’ help so that there was nothing left in that complaint. The error had been acknowledged in the correction on 26 November 2009.

LONGMORE LJ agreed and LORD NEUBERGER OF ABBOTSBURY MR gave a concurring judgment.