The claimant successfully applied for a continuation order in relation to a worldwide freezing order made against the defendant. The claimant sought an order for costs following the hearing of that application, contending that the ordinary approach to costs in relation to interim injunctions, which was to reserve costs until final determination of the substantive issue, did not apply to freezing injunctions because the balance of convenience formed no part of the test for the grant of such injunctions. The defendant submitted that the ordinary approach to costs was justified, given that the jurisdiction for both freezing injunctions and interim injunctions originated from section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
On the application for costs—
Held, application granted. The fact that the court’s jurisdiction to grant different orders stemmed from the same statutory source did not mean that the approach to costs ought to be the same for each order. The ordinary approach in relation to freezing injunctions was that the court should make an order for costs following the hearing of a continuation application, while reserving the costs of the original without notice application. In the present case, the claimant was entitled to its costs of the continuation application to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed (paras 20, 21, 31, 38).
George Hayman KC and Duncan McCombe (instructed by Lewis Silkin LLP) for the claimant.
Richard Slade & Partners LLP for the defendant.