Held, claim dismissed. (1) With regard to the appropriate intensity of review, and whether an exacting standard was appropriate or whether the court ought to be slow to intervene, the present case contained factors pointing both ways. On the one hand, the claimant sought a decision that the Secretary of State was obliged to change the Immigration Rules so as to grant to a category of people a right to enter the United Kingdom, and that it was irrational not to do so, whereas decisions on such intensely political matters were fundamental to the Secretary of State’s role as the person charged with determining immigration policy and it was for the Secretary of State, not the court, to make rules in that respect. It was further relevant that the Secretary of State's justification for not considering the proposed change to the Immigration Rules rests on a judgment as to the likely effect of the proposed change. On the other hand, the Secretary of State had never given active consideration to changing the Immigration Rules in the manner contended for by the claimant and, accordingly, there was no evidence as to what, if any, consideration the Secretary of State had given to the evidence relied on by the claimant and the Secretary of State's judgment as to the likely effect of the proposed change to the Immigration Rules was not alleged to be based on any evidence, nor did it involve the application of any specialised knowledge or expertise. With regard to the nature and gravity of what was at stake, there were similarly factors pointing either way. For child refugees who were unable to achieve family reunion outside the Immigration Rules, the proposed change would enable them to achieve family reunion and to put an end to the harmful effects of being separated from their families, but on the other hand those were individuals whose rights under article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms were not alleged to be breached under the current arrangements (paras 40–43).

(2) Bearing the foregoing factors in mind, it was not irrational for the Secretary of State to consider that any change to the Immigration Rules would create an incentive for children to be encouraged, or even forced, to leave their families and attempt hazardous journeys to the United Kingdom. Assuming that it was known to members of a child’s family that the child, if he or she reached the UK and was given refugee status, would be able to sponsor their entry into the UK and that they would then have a straightforward route to family reunion, it was not irrational for the Secretary of State to consider that some members of some families would see that as a reason to encourage their child to make the journey to the UK and that creating such an incentive would result in a sufficiently large number of children being so encouraged, or even forced, as to create a risk of harm that outweighed the other side of the balance. While there was no evidence the Secretary of State had received specialist or technical advice in making that judgment, which was an important factor to bear in mind, it was not irrational to consider that, if an incentive was created, it would have an effect in the form of a risk of the harm, includes potentially fatal harm, to children which could result from hazardous journeys and/or criminal gangs. In assessing the nature and extent of the effect of the proposed changes, the Secretary of State had to exercise a judgment as to the future. Moreover, it was a judgment to be made in a context where there was a route to family reunion for refugee children where the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms required it, and no other provision of English law required the Secretary of State to grant leave to enter the UK to members of the families of refugee children. Accordingly, in all the circumstances, the decision of the Secretary of State not to include a route to family reunion for child refugees was not irrational or unlawful. Nor, while it would be open to the Secretary of State to decide to reconsider the previous decision not to make the proposed change to the Immigration Rules, it was not irrational of him to decide not to reconsider that decision. In that regard, the Secretary of State has a discretion whether or not to initiate active consideration of policy changes in relation to all aspects of immigration policy and, while evidence relied on by the claimant presented a case for deciding to give active consideration to the change to the Immigration Rules, it was not such that no rational Secretary of State could reach the contrary decision (paras 52, 53, 55, 56, 65–67).