The claimant, a young person who was disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010, was the subject of an education, health and care plan maintained by the local authority under the Children and Families Act 2014 including provision for his special educational needs. The claimant appealed under section 51 of the 2014 Act against the contents of the plan and the First-tier Tribunal, allowing the appeal, ordered certain amendments and recommended others. In its decision the tribunal noted that it had taken into account the relevant sections of the 2014 Act, and the Special Educational Needs and Disability Code of Practice issued pursuant to section 77 of the 2014 Act, but it made no mention of the 2010 Act. On a further appeal by the claimant issues arose concerning the interface between the special educational needs provisions under the 2014 Act and obligations under the 2010 Act for a child who was disabled within the meaning of that Act.
On the claimant’s appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. The only interface between the Equality Act 2010 and Part 3 of the Children and Families Act 2014 was that both statutes had a shared aim of removing barriers to learning and that the issue of whether a child or young person had a disability for the purposes of Part 3 of the 2014 Act was determined by reference to the 2010 Act. Otherwise, the statutory regimes were entirely different and distinct, the 2014 Act being concerned with special education needs, for which it placed responsibility on the local authority in respect of any given child or young person with such needs, whereas, by contrast, the 2010 Act was concerned with disability discrimination and placed the duty to make reasonable adjustments squarely on the responsible body of a school. While an individual child or young person with special educational needs might often also be disabled within the meaning of the 2010 Act, so that matters arising in relation to their special education needs provision might in practice also overlap with questions of reasonable adjustments under the 2010 Act, the reasonable adjustment provisions were not to be imported into the entirely different regime of the 2014 Act and a tribunal hearing a special educational needs appeal under the 2014 Act was not required to consider them. That position was unaffected by the Special Educational Needs and Disability Code of Practice which simply sought to summarise the legislative duties under the two Acts. The tribunal’s decision in the present case did not involve any material error of law (paras 46–51, 60).
Emma Waldron (acting pro bono) (instructed by Independent Provider of Special Education Advice) for the claimant.
Andrew Cullen (instructed by Browne Jacobson LLP) for the local authority.