Vice-President L Bay Larsen,
Presidents of Chambers A Arabadjiev, A Prechal (Rapporteur), I Jarukaitis, N Jääskinen, I Ziemele, J Passer,
Judges J-C Bonichot, T von Danwitz, M Safjan, A Kumin, N Wah
Advocate General P Pikamäe
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) informed the EU member states of the risk of extreme undervaluation of imports of textiles and footwear from China which, in most cases, were made by organised criminal companies (“the undervaluation fraud”) and requested them to monitor imports of such goods, to carry out appropriate checks to verify that the declared customs values reflected true market values, and to take appropriate safeguard measures. To that end, OLAF together with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), developed a risk assessment tool based on EU-wide data (“the OLAF-JRC method”), which was a statistical method for determining the value for customs purposes of undervalued imports using pre-clearance customs controls. Although that method was not one prescribed by the EU Customs Codes, it was recommended to all the member states, and it was emphasised that the EU rules on determining value for customs purposes had to be applied due to the potential loss of traditional EU own resources arising from undervalued imports. However, the UK Commissioners for Revenue and Customs (“the Revenue”) informed OLAF that the risk indicators recommended under that method would be counterproductive and disproportionate given the volume of relevant imports in the UK. The Revenue established that additional customs duties had to be applied in the case of 24 traders for imports over a three-year period and sent 24 post-clearance duty recovery demands, known as “demand notes” or “C18s”. However, those demands were later cancelled because, according to the Revenue, there was no acceptable re-valuation method. Under an investigation directed at certain member states, including the UK, OLAF informed the Revenue that statistics showed that the UK was attracting more fraudulent trade in the relevant goods on account of the measures that had been taken by other member states to counter the undervaluation fraud at issue. Accordingly, the UK authorities launched an operation to combat that fraud and to determine the customs value of the undervalued imports in order to claim the corresponding amounts of traditional own resources evaded, using post-clearance recovery demands, following the cancellation of the 24 original demand notes. OLAF closed its investigation and delivered its report, in which it stated that there had been a substantial increase in the scale of the undervaluation fraud in the UK on account of the inadequate nature of the checks made by the Revenue. According to that report, the UK failed to apply risk profiles based on the OLAF-JRC method, contrary to OLAF’s recommendations, and only carried out customs checks on importation in a one-month period. Consequently, according to that report, the UK released a large quantity of relevant goods from China for free circulation without conducting appropriate customs controls, with the result that a substantial proportion of the customs duties due were not collected or made available to the Commission. Subsequently, Commission agents carried out five inspections in the UK. During those inspections the UK authorities admitted that they had not implemented the measures requested by OLAF due to advice from their legal department, which had led to the cancelation of the 24 demand notes. The authorities refused to supply a copy of that advice on the grounds that it was confidential and subject to legal professional privilege. Instead of the OLAF-JRC method, the Revenue implemented national risk thresholds or profiles using post-release customs controls. Meanwhile, the Revenue conducted an operation concerning VAT fraud, which was the basis for a criminal investigation of four major traders importing textiles from China. Some imports were made under the customs procedure assigned code 42 in the list of EU customs procedures (“customs procedure 42”), under which, according to the exemption mechanism provided for in articles 138 and 143 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (“the VAT Directive”), customs duties were paid on importation and VAT had to be paid at a later stage in the member state of destination. Other imports that were made using “customs procedure 40” under which, pursuant to articles 2 and 85–87 of the VAT Directive, VAT was to be collected by the member state of importation and the taxable amount for VAT purposes included the customs value as well as customs duties. Consequently, considering that the UK had neither taken into account the correct amounts of customs duties nor made available to it the correct amounts of traditional own resources and own resources deriving from VAT relating to the relevant imports, the Commission brought an action for a declaration that the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Union rules relating to the control and supervision of the recovery of own resources, customs law and VAT, which had led to a loss of more than €2,679m in EU own resources.
On the action—
Held, action allowed in part. (1) It was for the customs authorities of the member states to ensure that EU customs law was applied and to undertake appropriate customs controls in order to protect the EU’s financial interests. Those authorities had to work continuously, consistently and systematically, not limited to occasional participation in customs operations. In order to combat infringements liable to impede the collection of traditional own resources constituted by customs duties, the member states had to provide for adequate criminal penalties for serious fraud, as well as effective and dissuasive customs control measures which could not be determined in an abstract and static manner. In the present case the European Commission had established to the requisite legal standard that, from the start of the infringement period, the UK had sufficient knowledge of the undervaluation fraud in issue and of the measures which OLAF and the Commission recommended that it take to tackle that fraud effectively, namely, pre-clearance customs controls of consignments identified on the basis of the OLAF-JRC risk analysis tool. Accordingly, the system of customs controls put in place by the UK during the infringement period to combat that fraud, limited as it was to post-clearance action to recover duties, was not tailored to the characteristics of that fraud and manifestly failed to respect the principle of effectiveness laid down in article 325(1) of the FEU Treaty and showed that the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU customs legislation. Further, any non-binding common measure that could be adopted in relation to the risk analysis and management criteria referred to in the EU customs legislation was part of the fight against fraud referred to in article 325. Therefore, the member states had to take due account of any such criteria which had been recommended by the EU, if they had not developed national criteria that were at least as effective as those recommended. Accordingly, by failing to carry out customs controls based on risk analysis before clearance of the goods concerned, the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under the EU Customs Codes. Further, the UK authorities did not take appropriate customs control measures to verify the customs values declared in respect of relevant imports made throughout the infringement period in accordance with EU customs rules. Consequently, by calculating and entering customs duty in respect of those imports on the basis of incorrect values which were too low, the UK failed to fulfil its obligations under article 325(1) and EU customs law (paras 242, 257, 258, 279, 281, 292, 298, 319, 320, 322, 331–335, 601, 602, operative part).
(2) Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, and in view of the principles affirmed by previous Court of Justice authority, the UK failed to comply with the duty of sincere co-operation laid down in article 4(3) TEU, in so far as it did not provide in good time (i) full details of the calculations relating to the customs debts claimed in the original demand notes issued by the UK and then cancelled, which the Commission asked it to disclose and which were necessary for the purpose of calculating the amount of traditional own resources losses, and (ii) the reasons for the decisions cancelling the customs debts established by those original demand notes which the Commission also asked it to provide (paras 598–601, operative part).
(3) In relation to the alleged breach by the UK of its obligation to make available traditional own resources in general, since the management of the system of the EU’s own resources was entrusted to the member states alone, the obligations to collect, establish and place those resources on account with a view to making them available to the European Commission were imposed directly on the member states. Further, it was for the member states to protect the financial interests of the EU against fraud or any other illegal activities, and to adopt the measures necessary to guarantee the effective and comprehensive collection of customs duties and the corresponding resources. In the light of the characteristics of the system of the EU’s own resources, the UK did not establish or make available to the Commission all of the own resources relating to the relevant imports at the relevant time, contrary to EU legislation on own resources. Further, as a result of the inadequate controls of the customs values, the goods were accepted for importation into the EU when only a fraction of the customs duty due had been paid. Since, throughout the infringement period, massive quantities of the goods concerned were imported into the UK at an undervalue, the UK created an irreversible situation leading to considerable losses of own resources for the EU, for which the UK had to be held liable (paras 345–347, 365, 404, 601, 602, operative part).
(4) In relation to the alleged breach by the UK of its obligation to make available specific amounts of traditional own resources, the Commission could not be criticised for having used a statistical method, such as OLAF-JRC method, for the purpose of calculating the amounts of own-resource losses in the circumstances of the present case, since the relevant imports were made on a large scale and the goods concerned were released for free circulation and could not be recalled for checks to establish their true value. It followed that, in the absence of sufficient data in relation to the quality of the goods already released, it was no longer possible to determine the value of those goods on the basis of one of the evaluation methods provided for in the EU Customs Code and only a statistical method could be used. Accordingly, the Commission was entitled to apply the OLAF-JRC method to estimate the amount of traditional own resources losses for the second period of the infringement, since that method proved to be sufficiently precise and reliable, and did not lead to an overestimate of the amount of those losses. However, by relying on the OLAF-JRC method, the Commission failed to establish the amounts of own resources to the requisite legal standard in relation to the first period within the infringement period. Accordingly, the claim would be rejected in so far as it related to the amounts of resources listed for the first period, amounting to over €1,001m (paras 442–443, 447, 449, 450, 462, 463, 505, 522, 523, 533, 601, 602, operative part).
(5) A customs value that was declared below its true value necessarily meant that the taxable amount for VAT purposes was also determined incorrectly, so that the full amount of VAT could not be collected, in breach of articles 2(1)(d) and 85–87 of the VAT Directive. Accordingly, the UK failed to fulfil its obligations under articles 2(1)(d) and 85–87, in relation to imports made pursuant to customs procedure 40 under which both customs duties and VAT were required to be collected in the UK. However, the Commission did not demonstrate that that failure on the part of the UK customs authorities actually gave rise to losses of own resources accruing from VAT. Even if, in the case of imports made under customs procedure 40, the importers did not pay the VAT in full because the taxable amount of those imports was too low, that did not necessarily mean that the net VAT revenue was affected. Importers, like others operating downstream in the sale of the goods before they were invoiced to the final consumer, could recover the VAT which they paid. The question whether net VAT revenue was affected by the undervaluation that took place when those imports were made depended therefore on the price invoiced to the final consumer. In relation to imports made during the infringement period under customs procedure 42, under which, according to the exemption mechanism provided for by articles 138 and 143 of the VAT Directive, only customs duties were paid in the UK and VAT had to be paid in the member state of destination of the goods, it was for the authorities of the member states of destination, not for those of the UK as member state of importation, to ensure that the taxable amount for the purposes of VAT was correctly determined. Consequently, the UK had not failed to fulfil its obligations in relation to imports made during the infringement period under customs procedure 42 (paras 547–553, 561, 572–576. 577, 601, 602, operative part).
L Flynn and F Clotuche-Duvieusart, agents, for the European Commission.
James Eadie QC, Ian Rogers QC, Simon Pritchard, Thomas Sebastian and Raymond Hill (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
J-C Halleux, P Cottin and S Baeyens, agents, for the Kingdom of Belgium, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.
N Grünberg, agent, for the Republic of Estonia, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.
M Tassopoulou, agent, for the Hellenic Republic, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.
K Pommere, V Soņeca and I Kucina, agents, for the Republic of Latvia, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.
P Barros da Costa, S Jaulino, L Inez Fernandes and P Rocha, agents, for the Portuguese Republic, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.
B Ricziová, agent, for the Slovak Republic, intervening in support of the United Kingdom.