Held, appeal dismissed. (1) The parties’ right to silence did not arise on the present appeal. It applied and was exercised by them when, as was their right, they declined to answer questions put to them by the police in interview. In the Family Court it was the privilege against self-incrimination which directly applied. However, analysis of that privilege could not be conducted in a vacuum without reference to the evidential reality of the case. The fact that the parents’ statements did not contain any material which might incriminate them was an important factor to which particular weight could be attached. Even if the material subject to a disclosure application potentially contained incriminating evidence that factor did not establish a complete bar to disclosure. In such circumstances, the court would evaluate the application by giving careful consideration to the established factors before determining whether disclosure was necessary and proportionate. Thereafter section 98(2) of the Children Act 1989 prevented the use in criminal proceedings (other than for perjury) of evidence obtained by the police as a result of the disclosure application. That protection also rendered any question and “no comment” answer made in police interview about that disclosed evidence inadmissible. The admission of answers to, or refusals to answer, questions put at interview which were subsequently founded on the inadmissible disclosed evidence depended on the circumstances and was not susceptible to any broad statement of principle. Accordingly there had been no breach of the parents’ right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination (paras 23–25, 63, 64, 65-66, 67, 86, 87).

(2) The test to be applied by a court considering an application for disclosure of documents from family proceedings to the police, as formulated in the established authorities, was not causing difficulties and continued to deliver a fair and proportionate outcome. It remained fit for purpose and required neither revision nor the addition of further wording for cases concerning allegations of radicalisation or terrorism. A judge at the early stage of family proceedings, where any potential prosecution and criminal proceedings were matters which might occur in the future, was not in any position to ensure the overall fairness of the entire investigatory and trial process. A judge was required to do what he or she could to undertake a fair process in the Family Court. That included affording careful consideration to applications for disclosure, which ought only to be granted if the criteria set out in the established authorities were satisfied and it was necessary and proportionate to do so. Here the judge had rightly attributed significant weight to the factual context, alongside the other relevant factors, and there was no reason to conclude that he had fallen into error or to otherwise allow the appeal (paras 68–70, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87).