The defendant and a young woman (CB) were in the defendant’s speed boat, which CB was driving very fast, when it struck a submerged tree on the River Thames and turned over, throwing both of them into the water; neither was wearing a buoyancy aid or life jacket. CB was unresponsive when she was pulled from the water and subsequently died in hospital. The defendant was rescued by the RNLI. He was discharged from hospital the next day and was interviewed as a significant witness: he was not cautioned but the interview was recorded. He was subsequently charged with the manslaughter of CB on the basis that, as the owner of the boat and, under Thames byelaws, its master, he owed her a duty of care. He absconded and did not attend his trial. A bench warrant, not backed for bail, was issued. The issues before the jury were the nature and extent of any duty of care owed by the defendant to CB, breach of that duty, reasonable foreseeability of a serious and obvious risk of death, causation and whether such breach amounted to such gross negligence as constituted a crime. Throughout the trial the defendant was in communication with his legal advisors. He was convicted and appealed against conviction on the ground that the admissions he had made in interview, before he was cautioned, should have been excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Prior to the appeal being heard he surrendered to the authorities in the Republic of Georgia. He did not contest extradition to the United Kingdom and, on his return, he admitted an offence under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976 On the appeal he also sought to challenge his conviction in relation to the Bail Act offence on the ground that the extradition request made to the authorities in Georgia did not explicitly request extradition for this offence so that, by reason of the rule of specialty, there was no jurisdiction to deal with the offence.
On the appeal—
Held (1) Appeal against conviction of manslaughter dismissed. The thrust of sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was clear: it was to be fair to those who were suspected of committing a criminal offence and to ensure that their rights were respected. In the present case the obligation to caution was not triggered. The judge clearly accepted that at the time of the interview the relevant officers did not, in fact, suspect that any offence might have been committed. The judge summed up the case thoroughly and there was no criticism of the way in which he directed the jury (paras 53, 63, 64).
(2) Appeal in relation to the Bail Act allowed. It was common ground that the extradition request did not explicitly request extradition for the Bail Act offence. The correspondence between the extradition section of the Home Office and the head of the International Co-operation Unit at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia revealed an exchange of information about the different approaches to breach of bail, particularly in the context of speciality, but at no stage was a formal request made to pursue the defendant for his breach of bail. In those circumstances there was no basis in the extradition from Georgia to pursue the defendant for his breach of bail and the proceedings against him were a nullity. Accordingly, his appeal in relation to that aspect of the case succeeded (paras 71, 75).
Per curiam (i) Although the conviction and sentence for the Bail Act offence were quashed as a nullity it did not necessarily mean that the defendant was free of liability for his failure to attend. By section 151A(2) of the Extradition Act 2003 he could be dealt with in the UK for an offence committed before his extradition not only in the circumstances set out in section 151A(3) but also if the condition in section 151A(4) was satisfied, namely if he has returned to the territory from which he was extradited or he has been given an opportunity to leave the United Kingdom (para 76).
(ii) The circumstances surrounding failure to attend will generate difficulties in requests for extradition and, furthermore, there is no failsafe, or necessarily easy, answer. In every case the consent of the state from which extradition is sought should unequivocally be requested with an explanation of why this is necessary. If, in those circumstances, criminal proceedings have to be commenced (rather than proceedings by way of contempt of court), it should not be impracticable to start such proceedings at the time that extradition is sought (para 73).
Stephen Vullo QC, Andrew McGee and Kate O’Raghallaigh (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the defendant.
Aftab Jafferjee QC and Michelle Nelson QC (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Appeals Unit) for the Crown.
John Hardy QC (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Appeals Unit) for the Crown in relation to the Bail Act offence.