Held, claim dismissed. (1) The conduct of a humanist marriage fell within the ambit of article 9 of the Convention. Comparing like with like, the humanist couple who wished to have a marriage ceremony which manifested their beliefs were treated differently from a religious couple who wished to do so since, unlike their religious comparators, the conduct of their marriage ceremony according to their humanist beliefs would not be legally recognised absent the supervisory presence of state officials. That was a difference of treatment of substance not merely of form. Although many of the consequences of that difference, such as the additional costs involved, did not give rise to a fundamental point of principle, they represented differences of treatment which were more than de minimis, so that the treatment fell within the ambit of article 9 and, since belief fell under the category “other status”, was on a prescribed ground under article 14 of the Convention (paras 69, 93, 94, 129).

(2) The starting point in analysing whether the discrimination was justified (the burden being on the Secretary of State) was to apply the fourfold test laid down by the Supreme Court and ask whether: (i) the measure had a legitimate aim sufficient to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii) the measure was rationally connected to that aim; (iii) a less intrusive measure could have been used; and (iv) bearing in mind the severity of the consequences, the importance of the aim and the extent to which the measure would contribute to that aim, a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. The assessment of the balance struck required justification not of the measure in issue but of the difference in treatment between one person or group and another. As the Court of Appeal had observed, where there was a substantial degree of economic and/or social policy involved in a measure, the degree of deference to the assessment of the democratically-elected or -accountable body which had enacted the measure had to be accorded great weight because of the wide margin of judgment they had in such matters. The greater the element of economic and/or social policy involved, the greater the margin of judgment and the greater the deference which should be afforded, particularly when that body was Parliament. However, if the measure involved adverse discriminatory effects, that would reduce the margin of judgment and thus the degree of deference. That would be particularly so where the ground of discrimination concerned a core attribute such as sex or race. Whether that analysis was seen in terms of the application of the manifestly without reasonable foundation criterion or simply in terms of the usual balancing exercise inherent in the assessment of proportionality, the result should be the same (paras 96–100, 102, 103).

(3) Applying that analysis, the Secretary of State’s first stated aim was not legitimate, since it was no more than a statement of the discrimination about which the claimant complained. The second aim could only have any legitimacy as a preamble to the third aim, that of undertaking any reform on a wholesale rather than piecemeal basis. Otherwise, the Secretary of State would be seeking to justify the continuation of an established discriminatory difference of treatment, as between humanists and their religious comparators, on the basis that the remedy sought, namely providing legal recognition of marriages according to the usages of Humanists UK, might not address other differences in treatment. Any omission on the Secretary of State’s part, in his continuing failure to provide for state recognition of humanist marriages, notwithstanding the power afforded to him under section 14(4) of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 had to be seen both in the light of the Government’s considered response to the Marriages by Non-Religious Belief Organisations consultation in 2014 and the conclusions reached by the Law Commission. There was evidence to support the Secretary of State’s position that this was not an area where reform could properly be undertaken in a piecemeal fashion. Given, in particular, the recommendations made in the Law Commission’s scoping paper, the Secretary of State had demonstrated a legitimate aim in seeking to address this issue as part of a wider reform. Moreover, the measure adopted, essentially to maintain the existing differences in treatment arising from the Marriage Act 1949 until that reform took place, was rationally connected to that aim. As to less intrusive means, the claimants contended that an alternative, less discriminatory measure was already provided to the Secretary of State by means of the power afforded him under section 14(4) of the 2013 Act. The difficulty with that objection was that it did not engage with the Law Commission’s conclusion that the power was not, of itself, able to address the issues raised if any reform were limited to the legal recognition of marriage according to non-religious belief systems. Given the ongoing review of the law of marriage, the secretary of State had at this time established that a fair balance had been struck between the individual rights of the claimants and wider community interests. It therefore followed that the difference in treatment between humanists and their religious comparators was objectively justified (paras 107, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119, 128, 129).