On 8 April 2015 the claimant tenant obtained a judgment in her favour in her damages claim against the defendant landlord. Following the defendant’s failure to pay the damages due, an interim charging order was made in respect of the property. Subsequently, a final charging order was drawn up. The claimant wrote to the court requesting that the court exercise its powers under the slip rule in CPR r 40.12 to amend the final charging order as it failed to include the claimant’s costs, which had been included in the order of 8 April. The judge exercised her power under the slip rule, without notice to the defendant, and amended the final charging order to include “the sum of the amount now owing under a judgment or order given on 8 April 2015…together with any further interest becoming due”. The defendant’s application to have the charging order set aside was refused by the district judge. The defendant appealed, contending that the slip rule in CPR r 40.12 should not be used to make substantial amendments to an order but that the effect of the judge’s amendment to the final charging order was to add a significant amount to the amounts secured by that order.
On the defendant’s appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. That the purpose of CPR r 40.12 was to ensure that the order conformed with what the court intended, even if the error which had originally been made in drawing up the order was substantial; namely, the effect of which was very large. The key requirement in every case was simply that the order should reflect the actual intention of the court. The limitation on the rule was that there should genuinely have been an accidental error or omission. The slip rule should not be used to permit the court to have second or additional thoughts or to add a provision having substantive effect which was not in the contemplation of the parties or the court at the hearing. Even if the defendant had been correct as to the interpretation of the slip rule, the amendment which the district judge actually made could not be characterised as substantial (paras 27, 34).
Andrew Nicol (instructed by Carl Martin Solicitors) for the defendant.
Robert Brown (instructed by Anthony Gold Solicitors) for the claimant.